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THE EFFECT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS.
MUNSON PRIZE THESIS.
The courts of this country have long been accustomed to
recognize, and in proper cases to enforce, the judgments of the
courts of other jurisdictions. The constant development of trade
and friendly intercourse with other nations and between the
States, has expanded this branch of the law to such an extent,
that it becomes a matter of the greatest importance to determine
the effect of such foreign judgments.
The subject is a broad and difficult one and it is my object to
determine only a few of the general rules and principles govern-
ing it.
Although in practical effect it is of little consequence, yet
there has been some difference of opinion as to what is the basis
of the recognition of such judgments, and the theory of the later
authorities is completely at variance with principles at one. time
apparently well established. The earlier jurists based such recog-
nition solely on the ground of comity. Thus Chancellor Kent
says that "no sovereign is obliged to execute, within his domin-
ion, a sentence rendered out of it; and if execution be sought by
a suit upon the judgment, or otherwise, he is at liberty, in his
courts of justice, to examine into the merits of such judgment;
for the effect to be given to foreign judgments is altogether a matter
of comizy, in cases where it is not regulated by treaty." And Mr.
Justice Story cited and approved this theory.'
How completely Kent's statement of the law is at variance
with the modern rule anad theory will presently appear.
In the modern discussions of this question the rule of comity is
altogether ignored and the judicial recognition of foreign judg-
ments is based on the broader grounds of obligation, convenience
and expediency.2 The present theory was clearly and forcibly
1 2 Kentfs Conm 120; Story, Conflict of Laws, § 598.
2 Williams v. Jones, i3 M. & W. 633; Grant v. Easton, L. R. 13 Q. B.
Div. 302; Hilton v,. Guyott, 42 Fed. Rep. 249, 257.
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laid down by Judge Wallace of the United States Circuit Court
in a comparatively recent case, as follows: "These adjudications
ignore any considerations of comity as a factor in influencing the
effect of foreign judgments. They rest wholly upon the practical
and sensible doctrine which is applied to domestic judgments, that
a litigant who has had a fair opportunity to try his cause before a
competent tribunal, and has availed himself of it, should acquiesce
in the result, and, if he has reason to complain, should pursue
those means for correcting error provided by the jurisprudence of
the tribunal instead of resorting to another court. This is a much
safer and more reasonable doctrine than that of the earlier adju-
dications, and if it works injustice in occasional instances, works
less hardship generally and promotes justice upon the whole. "
These principles, however, are only applicable to strictly for-
eign judgments. The recognition of sister State judgments is of
course based upon the full faith and credit clause of the Constitu-
tion of the United States, and the acts of Congress passed to
enforce it.
In the early history of this Republic the application of the
constitutional provision to the subject under discussion was very
important, and carried out in an effectual manner the intention of
its founders to give the greatest possible effect to sister State
judgments. It necessarily followed that they were more
conclusive than strictly foreign judgments, and there was for a
long time a considerable difference in the rules applicable to the
two classes of cases. Many of the best authorities have consid-
ered this difference so important that they have treated sister
State judgments as a distinct branch of the subject. In an
exhaustive treatise, this separation undoubtedly simplifies matters
and is open to no serious objection, but it involves so much unnec-
essary repetition that it will not be attempted in this article.
It is proper to observe here, and it will appear clearly in the
course of the discussion, that these distinctions between strictly
-foreign and sister State judgments are now mostly abolished.
And it would seem, from the tendency of the courts in
recent years that they will soon be entirely done away with. More
confidenice is felt in the good faith of other nations, and the fact
that a foreign tongue does not interfere with clearness of percep-
tion and integrity and rectitude of decision is now recognized.
By the term foreign judgments, therefore, as used generally in
3 Hilton v. Guyott, 42 Fed. Rep. 249, 257.
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this article, I mean both strictly foreign judgments and sister State
judgments. Where it is necessary to make a distinction, the use
of the appropriate terms will make it clear.
It can be safely stated as a general rule of universal applica-
tion, that the judgment of a foreign court is conclusive as to all
matters which it professes to decide, provided it was rendered by
a lawfully constituted court, of competent jurisdiction, and in the
absence of fraud in obtaining the decree.
4
This rule, it will be observed, precludes an inquiry into the
the merits of the original controversy, and has been, from early
times, the express doctrine applicable to foreign judgments in rem.
As to foreign judgments in personam, however, this was not
the rule established by the early cases. It was formerly held that
they were merely prima facie evidence, and the case might be
reexamined on its merits. 5
The first step toward the establishment of the present rule was
taken by Lord Ch. J. Eyre, who suggested that while foreign
judgments were merely prima fade evidence when set up as a
cause of action, they should be conclusive in every other case, and
a good bar when pleaded as a defense.6 The reason for this dis-
tinction was, that if it was thus voluntarily submitted to their
jurisdiction, it should be obligatory only to the extent which they
chose to make it, that is to say, "as consideration prima facie
sufficient to raise a promise."7
This distinction obtained for some time in England and was
adopted in this country, but it was gradually abolished, and it is
the settled rule to-day that a foreign judgment in Personam is
equally conclusive whether set up as a cause of action or used as a
defense.
Of the recent American decisions, few adhere to the old doc-
trine. Although we have as yet no authoritative ruling of the
Federal Supreme Court, the decided weight of authority both in
the State and lower Federal Courts, has established the rule, that
persondl judgments, rendered by a foreign court of competent
4 Bank of Australasia v.Nias, i6 Q. B. 717; Goddard v. Gray, L. R. 6 Q.
B. 139; Lazier v. Westcott, 26 N. Y. 14; Baker v. Palmer, 83 Ill. 568, 574;
Hilton v. Guyott, 42 Fed. Rep. 249; McMullen v. Richie, 41 Fed. Rep. 502.
6 Walker v. Witter, i Doug. z, 6; Sinclair v. Frazer, 2 How. St. Tr. 469;
Burnham v. Webster, i Wood & M. 172; Buttrick v. Allen, 8 Mass, 273;
Green v. Sarmiento, i Pet. C. C. 74.
6 Phillips v. Hunter, 2 H. B1. 402, 40.
7 Phillips v. Hunter, supra.
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jurisdiction, are binding and conclusive, and cannot be examined
on the merits. 8
The above remarks apply particularly to strictly foreign judg-
ments, and, while the same rules obtain at present in actions on
sister State judgments, the reasons on which they are based are slightly
different. The Constitution provides that "full faith and credit
shall be given in each State to the public acts, records, and judi-
cial proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by
general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records and
proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof.-9 In pursu-
ance of this provision the' Congress soon passed the following act:
"That the records and judicial proceedings of the courts of any
State shall be proved or admitted in any other court within the
United States, by the attestation of the clerk, and the seal of the
court annexed, if there be a seal, together with the certificate of
the judge, chief justice, or presiding magistrate, as the case may
be, that the said attestation is in due form. And the said records
and judicial proceedings, authenticated as aforesaid, shall have
such faith and credit given to them in every court within the
United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the States
from whence said records are or shall be taken.' 10 This was
extended by a subsequent provision "to the territories of the
United States and the countries subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States.""
The only question therefore, as between the States, was to
determine the effect of these constitutional and statutory provis-
ions. There was for some time a great diversity of opinion as to
their proper construction, and there was a strong tendency in
some courts practically to nullify their effect, by declaring that
the record of a judgment of another State thus authenticated was
only conclusive as to the fact that such judgment had been passed,
leaving their effect to be ascertained by the rules of the common
law.' 2 It is obvious that the effect of this construction was to put
them on the same basis as strictly foreign judgments, which at
that time were onlyprima facie evidence of debt.
Other courts were inclined to put them on the same footing as
8 Lazier v. Westcott, 26 N. Y. 146; Baker v. Palmer, 83 Ill. 568; McMullen
v. Ritchie, 41 Fed. Rep. 502; Hilton v. Guyott, 42 Fed. Rep. 249.
9 Cons. U. S., Art. 4, § I.
10 U. S. Rev. St. 905.
11 2 Stat. at Large 298.
12 Gleason v. Dodd, 4 Met. 333.
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domestic judgments, so that no plea would be admissible except
such as denied the existence of the judgment itself. 13 It is evident
that this rule was too broad and went too far the other way.
Such a rule might be construed to preclude an inquiry into the
jurisdiction.
The true rule, as it obtains at present, was stated by Mr. Jus-
tice Story in his opinion in the case of Mills v. Duryee. 14 He said;
"It is argued that this act provides only for the admission of such
records as evidence, but does not declare the effect of such evi-
dence when admitted. This argument cannot be supported.
The act declares that the record duly authenticated shall have
such faith and credit as it has in the State court from whence it is
taken. If in such court it has the faith and credit of evidence of
the highest nature, viz., record evidence, it must have the same
faith and credit in every other court. Congress has therefore
declared the effect of the record by declaring what faith and
credit shall be given to it." This case was shortly afterward
reaffirmed by the same court, 15 and has been generally followed
in the State courts.
The true doctrine, therefore, as to the construction of the full
faith and credit clause and the acts of Congress passed in accord-
ance therewith, as determined by this and later decisions of the
Supreme Court, is, that the judgment of a State court shall
receive the same faith and credit in other States which is accorded
to it at home. 16 And this is true even though such a judgment,
rendered under like circumstance by the courts where it is sought
to be enforced, would be absolutely void.17
Having thus established the rule that neither a foreign nor a
sister State judgment can be reexamined on the merits, let us
now inquire when they are impeachable for fraud, and what is
necessary to confer jurisdiction. By fraud in this connection is
meant fraud in obtaining the decree. That fraud may have been
back of that and tainted the original contract is of no importance.
That would have constituted a valid defense in the original action,
and to allow an inquiry in a suit on the judgment would amount
to a re-opening of the case on the merits.
13 Noble v. Gold, i Mass. 410; Armstrong v. Carson, 2 Dall. 302; Gleason
V. Dodd., supbra.
14 7 Cranch, 481.
15 Hampton v. McConnel, 3 Wheat. 234.
16 Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. 270; Renand v. Abbot, 116 U. S. 277.
17 Ritter v. Hoffman, 35 Kan. 215.
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But even the rule that there can be an inquiry as to whether
fraud was practiced in obtaining the decree must be received with
great caution at the present time. To be sure this rule still
obtains in actions on strictly foreign judgments,18 but it is much
qualified in its application, where it is interposed as a defense in
an action to enforce the judgments of sister States. It is cer-
tainly the settled law, that such a defense is not admissible unless
it could be set up in the courts of the State where the judgment
was rendered.19 This in fact is the true test. Any rule absolutely
forbidding an inquiry in regard to fraud, would, in effect, be giv-
ing greater faith and credit than the judgment receives at home,
which is more than the Constitution requires.
Want of jurisdiction is fatal to any decree, and an inquiry can
be made by any court in which the judgment of another court is
sought to be enforced.so This is true in those cases in which suit
is brought on the judgment of a court of a sister State, even
though the effect of such an inquiry may be to contradict the
record.
The constitutional provision that "full faith and credit shall
be given in each State to the public acts, records and judicial
proceedings of every other State" can mean no more than that
full faith and credit shall be given to the valid and lawful judg-
ments and records of the courts of a sister State. If the want of
jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the record "the document
is stripped of its character and dignity as a record, no presump-
tion will be indulged in its favor, and it will not be treated as
possessing any force or validity whatever." 21
Even if it appears on the face of the record that the jurisdic-
tion attached, the later and better authority has established the
rule that it may still be questioned. The mere recital should not
be conclusive, for the credibility of the record itself depends on
the competency of the court whence it issues. "On the whole we
think it clear that the jurisdiction of the court by which a judg-
ment is rendered in any State, may be questioned in a collateral
proceeding in another State, notwithstanding the provisions of the
fourth article of the Constitution and the law of 179o, and not-
18 Rankin v. Goddard, 54 Me. 28, 89 Am. Dec. 718; Ward v. Quinlivin, 57
Mo. 425.
19 Anderson v. Anderson, 8 Ohio io8; Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. 290;
Maxwell v. Stewart, 22 Wall. 77; Hanley v. Donoghue, T16 U. S. 1, 4.
20 Story, Conf. of Laws, 586; Rose v. Himely, 4 Cranch. 241.
21 Black on Judgments, 895.
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withstanding the averments contained in the record of the judg-
ment itself. "2'
The presumption to be sure is in favor of the jurisdiction of
the court pronouncing the judgment, and the presumption is even
stronger where the credibility of the record is in question, but it
is not conclusive and can be rebutted by strong proof to the con-
trary.
What then is necessary to give a court jurisdiction so that a
decree there rendered cannot be impeached in a collateral pro-
ceeding in another jurisdiction ?
In order to render a judgment valid and binding in every
respect, it is essential for the court to have jurisdiction of the
cause, the res and the parties.2 3 An inquiry into these elements
of its authority is always proper.
It does not appear worth while to dwell at any length upon, or
to attempt to determine, when the court would have jurisdiction
over the cause. Nor indeed would it be possible to lay down any
general rules applicable to all courts. This is a matter that is
dependent entirely on statutes, which determine the rule in each
case, and which differ greatly in different jurisdictions.
As to the res, if the matter in controversy is land, or other
immovable property, the judgment of the forum rei site always
governs. On the other hand, the judgment of a foreign court
touching such immovable property is of no binding force.2
There is an apparent exception to the last rule, in the case of
a court of equity, in a suit between parties properly within the
jurisdiction, decreeing specific performance of a contract for the
sale of land situated in another jurisdiction. Relief is given in
this case for the reason that equity always acts in tersonam. It
does not operate directly upon the land, but simply compels the
person within its jurisdiction to obey its decree. This decree is
in its very nature a personal decree, and jurisdiction over the
parties is all that is necessary.25
So also if the matter in controversy is movable property, the
judgment of the forum rei site is conclusive, provided such prop-
erfy was properly within the jurisdiction of the court. It is
22 Mr. Justice Bradley in Thompson v. Whitman, i8 Wall. 457; see also
Knowles v. Gasligft Co., ig Wall. 58; Hall v. Lanning, 9i U. S. 16o; Pennoyer
v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714.
23 Story, Conf. of Laws. § 586; Rose v. Himely, 4 Cranch. 241; Cheriot v.
Foussat, 3 Binn. 220.
24 Story, Conf. of Laws, § 591.
25 Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch. 148.
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essential, however, that such jurisdiction should be bona fide and
not obtained by fraud. So, where the subject matter of the litiga-
tion is property, properly within the jurisdiction of the court,
jurisdiction of the parties is not necessary. But when we say that
judgments are binding in such case, we mean binding only in rem,
i. e., to the extent of the property attached. It is obvious that a
court cannot render a binding personal judgment unless it has also
obtained jurisdiction of the person.
These principles are particularly important in admiralty cases,
and, if jurisdiction is rightfully obtained, the judgments of
admiralty courts, in prize cases, forfeitures, collisions and the like,
are binding and conclusive the world over, as to all matters essen-
tial to the decree.26 Indeed this rule is carried to the extent of hold-
ing such a decree binding, even though it was given under sover-
eign edict, unjust in itself, and which had been declared by the
United States government to be a direct and flagrant violation of
international law.27
In those actions in rem where the primary object is to deter-
mine the status, jurisdiction over the parties, or at least over one
of them, is essential from the very nature of the case. Thus, in
order that a decree of divorce shall be valid, one of the parties,
usually the applicant, must be bonafide domiciled within the territo-
rial jurisdiction of the court. The other party may be a non-resi-
dent, and constructive service of process only, is sufficient.28
Finally, what is necessary to give a court jurisdiction over the
parties? There can certainly be no question if they were domi-
ciled within the territorial jurisdiction, or if they entered into the
contract there, or if they voluntarily came there to bring suit.
The question arises usually where the defendant was not a res-
ident of the State or country where the judgment was rendered.
In this case personal service of process within the jurisdiction is
necessary, and a judgment, without personal service, or notice, or
appearance, is a mere nullity.29 Extra-territorial service of
process is, for this purpose, absolutely ineffectual. A judgment
obtained upon such service, where no appearance is made by the
person served, can impose no personal liability which will be
recognized beyond the jurisdiction of the court in which the action
26 The Helena, 4 Ch. Rob. 3; Williams v. Armroyd, 7 Cranch. 423.
27 Williams v. Armroyd, sufira.
28 2 Bishop, Mar. & Div. § 155, 156; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714;
Tolen v. Tolen, 2 Blackf. 407.
29 Bishoff v. Wethered, 9 Wall. 812.
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originated.3 0 If however, the defendant, after such a service,
files an answer and allows the case to proceed to judgment, such
judgment will be valid everywhere.3 1 Personal service within the
territorial limits, (in the absence of fraud in getting the party
there), gives the court jurisdiction, and having once attached, it is
not lost even if he immediately escapes.
These principles are important in their application to non-resi-
dent corporations, and many of the States now make the appoint-
ment of a resident officer or agent, authorized to accept service,
a condition precedent to the right to do business within their
borders.
I have not attempted in this article to do more than determine
a few of the general rules and principles applicable in testing the
validity of judgments when questioned collaterally in another
jurisdiction. To these rules there are exceptions, however, some
of the most important of which it will be well to notice.
In the first place it is necessary that a foreign judgment should
be valid, subsisting and final. It should be capable of enforce-
ment and fit to serve as the foundation for final process in the
place where it was rendered. Adjudications, therefore, which are
merely interlocutory, cannot properly be made the foundation for
a suit, nor are they conclusive upon a similar application in an
action in another State. a2 Similarly the courts will not give effect
to foreign judgments rendered upon summary proceedings, in
derogation of the common law and justified only by local stat-
utes.3 3
Nor is any State or nation bound to recognize the penal or
revenue laws, or the local police regulations of another jurisdic-
tion. The courts therefore will not enforce any decree of a for-
eign court where such laws were the foundation of the decree.84
There was formerly some difficulty in determining the mean-
ing of the word "penal " or "penalty" as used in this connection.
In a recent case before the Supreme Cotfrt of the United States it
was construed to mean vengeance, not reparation. It therefore
80 Shepard z. Wright, 59 How. Pr. 512; McEwan v. Zimmere 38 Mich.
765; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714.
31 Jones v. Jones, 36 Hun. 414.
32 Brinkley v. Brinkley, So N. Y. 184.
83 Sevier v. Roddie, 51 Mo. 580; Anderson v. Haddon, 33 Hun. 435.
34 The A4ntelo.e, zo Wheat. 66, 123; Attrill v. Huntington, 70 Md. x99
affirmed in Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657."
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applies only to forfeitures payable to the public or to representa-
tives of the public, not to individuals.
5
There is one other distinction which it would be well to notice.
In the case of strictly foreign judgments there is no merger of the
original cause, and suit can be brought upon the original contract
rather than upon the judgment, if the party suing thinks it for his
interest to do so.36 In the case of a sister State judgment, how-
ever, the original cause of action is merged.
Harry G. Day.
31 Huntington v. Attrill, sufira.
85 Hatch v. Spofford, 22 Conn. 495; Bank of U. S. v. Merchants Bank, 7
Gill. 415; Green v. Starr, 52 Vt 426; Hogg v. Charlton, 25 Pa. St. 2oo; Barnes
v. Gobbs, 31 N. J. Law. 317.
